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SHAFFER V. HEITNER'S EFFECT ON PRE-JUDGMENT
ATTACHMENT, JURISDICTION BASED ON PROPERTY,
AND NEW YORK'S SEIDER DOCTRINE: HAVE WE
FINALLY GIVEN UP THE GHOST OF THE RES?
INTRODUCTION
Almost two decades ago, then Associate Justice Roger Traynor of
the California Supreme Court, called for the application of a uniform
standard to all forms of state court jurisdiction. Traynor observed
that, while modem standards for personal jurisdiction had expanded
the power of courts over nonresidents, no comparable change had oc-
curred in standards for the exercise of jurisdiction over property.
Traynor argued that these dual standards, and the archaic statutory
provisions governing the exercise of jurisdiction, often forced courts
away from modem notions of jurisdiction based on fairness and sub-
stantial justice.1
It is time we had done with mechanical distinctions between in rem
and in personam, high time now in a mobile society where property
increasingly becomes intangible and the fictional res becomes
stranger and stranger. Insofar as courts remain given to asking "Res,
res-who's got the res?," they cripple their evaluation of the real
factors that should determine jurisdiction. They cannot evaluate the
real factors squarely until they give up the ghost of the res.2
In 1977 the Supreme Court, in Shaffer v. Heitner,8 finally forced
courts to consider "the real factors" behind any decision to exercise
jurisdiction. Justice Marshall's majority opinion declared that "all as-
sertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
standards set forth in International Shoe v. Washington and its prog-
eny."4 A defendant in an in rem5 action must now have "certain mini-
1. Traynor, Is this Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REv. 657, 657-64
(1959).
2. Id. at 663.
3. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
4. Id. at 212.
5. Assertions of jurisdiction based on property are of three types: (1) in rem ac-
tions involving the ownership of the property on which jurisdictin is based, which affect
the interests of all people in that property; (2) quasi in rem actions involving the owner-
ship of the property on which jurisdiction is based, which affect the interests of the
parties only; and (3) quasi in rem actions in which the property is conceded to belong
to the defendant, but the plaintiff attempts to apply the property to a satisfaction of a
claim against the defendant. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS,
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mum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' -I
Although Shaffer has extended the minimum contacts standard to
all assertions of jurisdiction, the majority opinion does not explicitly
discuss the impact Shaffer will have on the procedures used to obtain
some types of in rem jurisdiction, or the importance of the limited ap-
pearance in assessing the validity of some exercises of jurisdiction. Nor
does 'the majority provide a clear indication of the validity of asser-
tions of jurisdiction based on the attachment of certain types of in-
tangibles, such as insurance policies, which may be related to the con-
troversy. This Comment will first, attempt to explain the likely effect
of Shaffer on these outgrowths of traditional in rem jurisdiction; and
second, consider Shaffer's effect on New York's Seider doctrine.7 The
starting point for any discussion of the effects of Shaffer must be Shaf-
fer itself.
I. SHAFFER v. HEITNER
Arnold Heitner, the owner of one share of Greyhound Corpora-
tion stock, filed a shareholder's derivative suit charging that twenty-
eight present and former officers or directors of Greyhound, or a
wholly owned subsidiary, had breached their duty to the corporation.
This alleged breach of duty resulted in a treble-damages antitrust
judgment and a criminal contempt conviction against the corporation,
both causing substantial economic loss. Although the activities which
caused these penalties occurred in Oregon, and although Greyhound
had its principal place of business in Arizona, Heitner filed his suit
in Delaware, Greyhound's state of incorporation. He attempted to ac-
quire jurisdiction by sequestering stock or options owned by twenty-
one of the defendants. According to the record, none of the stock cer-
tificates were actually in Delaware. A state law," however, placed the
situs of ownership for sequestration in Delaware.
Heitner gave notice to all twenty-eight defendants by certified
mail and by publication in Delaware. Only the twenty-one defendants
Introductory Note at 191 (1971). This Comment will refer to all three categories col-
lectively when it uses the term "in rem jurisdiction." Unless otherwise indicated, "quasi
in rem jurisdiction" will refer only to the third type of jurisdiction.
6. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
7. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
8. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (Rev. 1974).
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whose property had been seized responded. They made a special ap-
pearance to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery.
The court, in a letter opinion, refused to grant defendants' mo-
tion to quash the attachment and dismiss the suit. The vice chancellor
held that Delaware could assert jurisdiction over the defendants sim-
ply because ,the situs of the stock was Delaware. The court also found
the Delaware sequestration procedure to be constitutional. 9 After the
motion to quash and dismiss was denied, the defendants appealed to
the Supreme Court of Delaware. That court, after analyzing in detail
the defendants' procedural due process argument, and rejecting cur-
sorily the contention that "minimum contacts" were necessary to as-
sert in rem jurisdiction, affirmed the vice chancellor's decision.10
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiori and reversed. Jus-
tice Marshall, writing for the Court, stated that the appellants "con-
tend[ed] that the sequestration statute as applied in this case violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . .because
it permit[ted] the state courts to exercise jurisdiction despite the ab-
sence of sufficient contacts among the defendants, the litigation and
the State of Delaware .... .I' In order to evaluate this contention,
Justice Marshall was forced to decide which standards should be used
to determine whether sufficient contacts existed in Shaffer.
He set 'the stage for his determination by giving a short history
of jurisdiction in the United States.' 2 The Court observed that Pen-
9. Heitner v. Greyhound Corp., Letter Opinion of the Court of Chancery, Civil
Action No. 4514 (Del. Ch. May 12, 1975), reprinted in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, Record at A24.
10. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, - Del. , 361 A.2d 225 (1976).
11. 433 U.S. at 189. Appellants' brief did not argue that Delaware needed to
show contacts between the appellants and the forum in order to exercise quasi in rem
jurisdiction. The brief argued that minimum contacts were required because Delaware
was really attempting to acquire personal jurisdiction. Delaware Law does not allow for
a limited appearance. See Sands v. Lefcourt Realty, 35 Del. Ch. 340, 117 A.2d 365(1955). Appellants contended that this decision presented them with the choice of
defending on the merits and subjecting themselves to personal liability in excess of the
value of the seized property, or defaulting and losing the seized property. They claimed
that this choice, in effect, coerced them into consenting to personal jurisdiction in a
forum which could not constitutionally compel them to defend personally. Appellants'
Brief on the Merits at 20-23. The appellants also contended that since the stock certifi-
cates were not in Delaware, the state could not validly exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction.
Appellants' Reply Brief at 12.
Justice Marshall chose not to analyze these two narrow theories, and instead focused
on whether minimum contacts were present for the assertion of any type of jurisdiction.
433 U.S. at 206. This broadening of the question indicates that the Court did not
intend its decision to be construed narrowly.
12. 433 U.S. at 196-206. See also Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambival-
ence in Jurisdiction Theory, 26 U. KAN. L. Rav. 61, 68-69 (1977).
1978]
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noyer v. Neff13 had established a territorial theory of jurisdiction.
Under that theory, a state had power over persons and property within
its borders and could not adjudicate controversies involving persons
and property beyond its boundaries. The state could, however, adjudi-
cate controversies involving nonresident defendants who owned prop-
erty within -the state by attaching the property. Marshall then noted
that the standards governing personal jurisdiction had outgrown the
strict territorial theory of Pennoyer, and were now governed by the
minimum contacts and fairness theory introduced by International
Shoe Co. v. Washington.4 The standards for the assertion of jurisdic-
tion based on property, however, were still determined by the terri-
torial theory. The Court recognized that most commentators15 and
several lower court opinions 6 had questioned the continued validity
of a separate standard for in rem jurisdiction, especially in light of
the expanded reach of personal jurisdiction under International Shoe.
Marshall noted the extension of constitutional notice requirements to
in rem jurisdiction, and observed:
It is clear, therefore, that the law of state court jurisdiction no
longer stands securely on the foundation established in Pennoyer.
We think the time is ripe to consider whether the standard of fair-
ness and substantial justice set forth in International Shoe should be
held to govern actions in rem as well as in personamY
Justice Marshall's main argument was that in rem jurisdiction
does not really concern just property. When courts exercise in rem
13. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
14. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
15. 433 U.S. at 205. Marshall cited Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal
Jurisdiction: The 'Power' Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956);
Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. RaV. 241; Traynor,
supra note 1; Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Anal-
ysis, 79 HAiRv. L. REv. 1121 (1966); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction,
73 HaRv. L. REv. 909 (1960). Other good discussions questioning the validity of quasi
in rem jurisdiction include Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdic-
tion, 76 HARv. L. REv. 303 (1962). Zammit, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded
and Unconstitutional? 49 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 668 (1975); Comment, Long-Arm and
In Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MicH. L. REv. 300
(1970).
16. 433 U.S. at 205. Marshall cited United States Indus. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142
(3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530
F.2d 1123, 1130-43 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring); Bekins v. Huish, I Ariz.
App. 258, 401 P.2d 743 (1965); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d
960 (1955), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958); Camire v. Scieszka 116 N.H. 281, 358 A.2d 397
(1976). See also Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co. 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 958 (1974).
17. 433 U.S. at 206.
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jurisdiction they actually exercise jurisdiction over a person's interest
in the property. According to Marshall, since both in personam and
in rem jurisdiction affect the person's interest in "the thing," the ap-
propriate constitutional standard for determining whether either type
of jurisdiction can be exercised is the International Shoe standard of
minimum contacts and "traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice."' 8 Marshall felt that most assertions of in rem jurisdiction
would be unaffected by the adoption of the minimum contacts stand-
ard.'0 He said that in cases where the underlying controversy concerns
either the ownership of the property on which jurisdiction is based,20
or is directly related to the rights and duties flowing from that own-
ership,2' no further contacts will usually be necessary to justify juris-
diction. The property itself would suggest that the owner had taken
advantage of the forum state's protection and would indicate a cluster
of other ties with the forum.2-
Marshall cautioned, however, that this analysis would not apply
to cases like Shaffer, which involved a cause of action totally unre-
lated to the property.23 In such a case, the presence of property alone,
which only suggests other ties to the forum, would not, by itself, sup-
port jurisdiction. "If those other ties did not exist, cases over which
the State is now thought to have jurisdiction could not be brought in
that forum."241 Marshall noted that quasi in rem2 5 actions that have no
connection with the property upon which jurisdiction is based are
merely attempts to bring the defendant into a court of the plaintiff's
18. Id. at 207.
19. Id.
20. See note 5 supra.
21. These cases would include some quasi in rem actions. (In this Comment, "quasi
in rem" is used to describe only those actions in which the dispute does not directly
concern title to the property, but where the property may be used to satisfy any judg-
ment. See note 5 supra.) See note 23 infra for a discussion of when an action is related
to property.
22. 433 U.S. at 207-08.
23. Id. at 213. Marshall used a narrow definition of "related." He apparently felt
that an action is related to a piece of property only if it is related to "the rights and
duties growing out of that ownership." Id. at 208. Marshall gave one example: a tort
suit for injuries suffered on an absentee landowner's property. Id. at 208 n.29. He cited
with approval Dublin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1938), which involved
a tort action in which jurisdiction over the defendant was obtained under a long-arm
statute that allowed jurisdiction to be asserted in actions arising from the ownership of
real property. This type of statute, see e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302 (a) (4) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1977), has been interpreted more broadly, however, as allowing jurisdic-
tion as long as the action is connected with the property. See Bowsher v. Digby, 243
Ark. 799, 422 S.W.2d 671 (1968).
24. 433 U.S. at 209.
25. See note 5 supra.
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choosing; worse, plaintiffs often then obtain in personam jurisdiction
over the defendant through his appearance. Marshall reasoned that
allowing this type of quasi in rem action, without proof of contacts
sufficient to justify personal jurisdiction, allows states to do indirectly
what they cannot do directly: assert personal jurisdiction over a de-
fendant despite a lack of contact with him and in violation of funda-
mental fairness.2 1
Marshall considered and rejected three arguments in favor of
maintaining the Pennoyer standards for in rem jurisdiction. He re-
jected the argument that quasi in rem jurisdiction without minimum
contacts was necessary to prevent defendants from avoiding adverse
judgments by moving assets to jurisdictions where they did not have
enough contacts to be sued. Marshall questioned the practical signifi-
cance of this argument by noting that, to obtain quasi in rem juris-
diction, a plaintiff need not show that the defendant was trying to
hide his assets. Marshall discussed less drastic means of ensuring that
the plaintiff can satisfy his judgment, such as allowing him to attach
the defendant's assets wherever they might be found, once an action
is commenced in an appropriate jurisdiction.27 Another protection for
the plaintiff, Marshall said, is the full faith and credit given valid in
personam judgments rendered by sister states.28 Marshall indicated
that this gives the plaintiff sufficient ammunition against defendants
who shift their assets in attempts to avoid paying their obligations.29
Marshall also rejected the argument that the minimum contacts
test, when applied to quasi in rem jurisdiction, would create uncer-
tainty in a heretofore settled area of the law. He felt that International
Shoe could be applied to most assertions of quasi in rem jurisdiction
with predictable results. What little certainty could be gained by ap-
plying Pennoyer is, according to Marshall, not worth the potential
"sacrifice of 'fair play and substantial justice' " that such an applica-
tion would cost.30
Marshall conceded that the long history of quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion in the United States might itself indicate that the mere presence
of property satisfies the due process requirements necessary for an as-
sertion of jurisdiction. But since he could find no modem justification
26. Id. at 209-10.
27. This procedure was apparently followed in Carolina Light & Power Co. v.
Uranex, 46 U.S.L.W. 2194 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
28. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
29. 433 U.S. at 210.
30. Id. at 211.
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for jurisdiction based solely on the presence of property, the historical
argument was outweighed by the potential unfairness to defendants. 31
Marshall capped his analysis with what one commentator has
called the "magnificent dictum which will almost certainly come to
be known as the rule of Shaffer v. Heitner."32 Marshall declared "that
all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according
to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.' '3 3
II. SOME PROBLEM AREAS IN APPLYING SHAFFER
A. The Procedural Due Process Requirements for Foreign Attach-
ments
In the wake of Shaffer, some courts have interpreted existing
statutes that codified the Pennoyer standards for in rem jurisdiction
as requiring that minimum contacts exist before in rem jurisdiction
may be asserted.34 These statutes usually require, however, that the
31. Id. at 211-12.
32. Casad, supra note 12, at 72. It is a "dictum" because Shaffer directly con-
cerned only an assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction over intangibles only arguably lo-
cated in the forum state, a state that did not provide for a limited appearance. It is clear,
however, that Shaffer will not be limited to the facts before the Court. See O'Connor v.
Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 996 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Comment, Tradi-
tional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice Extended: Shaffer v. Heitner, 1977
UTAH L. Rav. 361, 371.
33. 433 U.S. at 212. All the Justices who participated in Shaffer endorsed the
extension of the minimum contacts standard to assertions of in rem jurisdiction. Mar-
shall, however, went beyond merely declaring the change in the law and remanding the
case to the lower court for further proceedings. He applied the minimum contacts test to
the facts in Shaffer and concluded that neither the property within Delaware nor the
appellants' other contacts with that state were sufficient to justify jurisdiction. Id.
at 2"13-16. Justice Brennan dissented from this section of Marshall's analysis, and said
that Delaware could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 219-29 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
Casad characterized the Shaffer majority opinion and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235 (1958), as stressing physical contacts with the forum state. Casad classified Justice
Brennan's dissent, with its stress on choice of law factors, with cases that propose a
wider view of minimum contacts and stress the fairness of allowing the forum state to
impose its power on the defendant. Casad, supra note 12, at 73-77.
34. See Intermeat, Inc., v. American Poultry Inc., No. 77-7481 (2d Cir. April 14,
1978) (quasi in rem jurisdiction under N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW §§ 314, 315, 5201, 6202(McKinney Supp. 1977), valid if sufficient contacts exist). This approach of construing
a statute which authorizes attachment of property to obtain jurisdiction as containing
a minimum contacts test was suggested in, e.g., Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: Reshaping the
Contour of State Jurisdiction, 11 Loy. L.A.L. Rv. 87, 105 (1977).
One commentator suggested, however, that Shaffer might require state legislatures
to enact new attachment statutes. "Shaffer may stand for the proposition that under any
state jurisdictional statute, the minimum contacts criteria upon which a statute is based
must be elaborated within its text in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny." Olsen,
Shaffer v. Heitner: A Survey of its Effects on Washington Jurisdiction, 13 GONZAGA L.
Rav. 72, 87 (1977).
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defendant's property in the forum state be attached before jurisdic-
tion can be asserted.35 Since the defendant is, at least temporarily, de-
prived of his property, in some circumstances the attachment may
be an unconstitutional violation of the defendant's procedural due
process rights.36 In Shaffer, both the courts below37 and the parties'
briefs38 stressed the procedural due process issue. The Supreme Court
did not explicitly consider this issue,39 concentrating instead on
whether Delaware had the power to adjudicate the controversy. None-
theless, both the Court's discussion of the lower court decisions and
its extension of the minimum contacts test to quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion will affect the procedural due process requirements for foreign
attachments.40
During the last nine years the Court expanded and then con-
tracted the procedural requirements for all forms of attachments. 41
35. See, e.g., Fish v. Bamby Bakers, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 511 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
36. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Republic Intermodal Corp., - Pa. _-, 375 A.2d
1285 (1977).
37. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, __ Del. -, 361 A.2d 225, 230-36 (1976).
38. Appellants' Brief on the Merits, at 7-20, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977); Appellees' Answering Brief at 2-11.
39. 433 U.S. at 189.
40. The application of minimum contacts to foreign attachments, see note 48
infra, may also pose some equal protection problems. Since foreign attachments are no
longer helpful in asserting jurisdiction, the foreign attachment is now justified solely by
security considerations. See note 48 infra and accompanying text. In those states in
which it is easier to attach a nonresident's property than that of a resident, e.g., N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAw § 6201 (McKinney Supp. 1977), nonresident defendants may argue that
these security considerations do not provide a rational basis for this distinction.
Those defendants who in the past argued that the state needed to show a com-
pelling reason to distinguish between residents and nonresidents in attachment statutes,
see, e.g., Central Security Nat'l Bank v. Royal Homes, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 476 (E.D.
Mich. 1974); Property Research Fin. Corp. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 413,
422-23, 100 Cal. Rptr. 233, 239-40 (1972); North Gen. Corp. v. Dutch Inns of America,
15 Cal. App. 3d 490, 495-97, 93 Cal. Rptr. 343, 346-48 (1971), were thwarted because
the court found either that the state need show only a rational basis for such a distinc-
tion, or, where defendants relied on the right-to-travel cases such as Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), that the attachment did not substantially affect the right
to travel. See, e.g., Central Security Nat'l Bank v. Royal Homes, Inc., 371 F. Supp. at
482 n.2. Since out-of-state residency appears not to be a suspect classification, see
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-8 (1978), the former finding, at
least, seems accurate.
41. See Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73 (1976); North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Aston Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663 (1974); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974): Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
See also Brabham, Sniadach Through Di-Chem and Backwards; An Analysis of Vir-
ginia's Attachment and Detinue Statutes, 12 U. RICH. L. REv. 157 (1977). While the
Supreme Court did not explicitly deal with the procedural requirements for foreign
attachments-attachments designed to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction-several lower
courts have grappled with the issue. See, e.g., Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123(3d Cir. 1976); Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing and Fin. Corp., 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.),
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The expansion occurred in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.42 and
Fuentes v. Shevin,43 in which the Court indicated that an adversary
hearing was usually necessary before the plaintiff could deprive the
defendant of the use of his property through an attachment or other
judicial seizure. According to Fuentes, notice and a pre-seizure hear-
ing could be dispensed with only in an "extraordinary situation." 44
The Court distinguished earlier cases upholding pre-hearing attach-
ments:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure
an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there
has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has
kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person
initiating the seizure has been a governmental official responsible for
determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that
it was necessary and justified in the particular instance.45
In a footnote, the Court declared that attachments necessary to secure
jurisdiction involved "a most basic and important public interest."46
The Court cited Ownbey v. Morgan,4 7 which involved a foreign at-
tachment,48 as an example of a case in which a pre-seizure hearing was
unnecessary.
Lower court decisions interpreted this reference as approval of
the procedures in Ownbey, which provided for no more than some
sort of notice and an opportunity to be heard before final judgment
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972), (overruling Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d
1123 (3d Cir. 1976) ); Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Berman, 431 F. Supp. 847 (D. Neb.
1977); Stanton v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 388 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); In re Law Research Servs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Gordon v.
Michel, 297 A.2d 420 (Del. Oh. 1972). One judge felt that the procedural due
process requirements for foreign attachments had become so complicated that he
could not rely solely on procedural due process to void a foreign attachment; he pre-
ferred instead to invalidate the attachment for lack of sufficient contacts between the
defendant and the forum, despite the quasi in rem nature of the jurisdiction asserted.
Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d at 1130, (Gibbons, J., concurring).
42. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
43. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
44. Id. at 90.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 90 n.23. Accord, North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S.
601, 610 (1975) (Powell, J. concurring); Aston Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 n.14 (1974); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600,
613 (1974); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. at 389.
47. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
48. A foreign attachment is an attachment of a nonresident's property intended
to provide the forum state with quasi in rem jurisdiction over the controversy.
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was levied against the attached property.49 Commentators attacked
these decisions, asserting that they were based on an overreliance on
Ownbey.50 One commentator argued -that the decisions also misinter-
preted Ownbey, since Ownbey did not address the issue of what the
full procedural requirements were for foreign attachments; it decided
only that a state could constitutionally require a defendant to post a
bond before he could contest the merits of a quasi in rem action.r1
Thus, any discussion of the procedural requirements for attachments
was dicta. Other commentators stressed that Fuentes' reference to
Ownbey suggested only that foreign attachments, by themselves, meet
but one of the Fuentes criteria for an "extraordinary situation"-state
interest. According to these commentators, the other two require-
mentS5 2 must still be met; the simple procedure suggested by Ownbey
is not enough. 53 Prior to Shaffer, some courts accepted these arguments
and invalidated various foreign attachment statutes for want of ade-
quate procedural safeguards.54
While Justice Marshall's opinion in Shaffer did not emphasize
the procedural due process issue, it did summarize the decision be-
low, 55 which relied heavily on Ownbey in upholding the Delaware
sequestration statute.56 In a footnote to this summary, Marshall agreed
that Ownbey did not involve a comprehensive analysis of the con-
stitutional constraints on foreign attachments, and continued: "We do
not read the recent references to Ownbey as necessarily suggesting that
Ownbey is consistent with more recent decisions interpreting the Due
Process Clause. '57 At a minimum, this footnote casts doubt on any fu-
49. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Holtzman, 401 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Merrill
Lynch Gov. Sec., Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Say. Bank, 396 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1975):
Usdan v. Dunn Paper Co., 392 F. Supp. 953 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Stanton v. Manu-
facturers Hanover Trust Co., 388 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Long v. Levinson,
374 F. Supp. 615 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Gordon v. Michel, 297 A.2d 420 (Del. Ch. 1972).
50. Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73
COLUmn. L. Rav. 749, 763-65 (1973); Comment, Foreign Attachment After Sniadach and
Fuentes, 73 COLUm. L. REv. 342, 344-46 (1973); Note, Quasi in Rem jurisdiction and
Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE L.J. 1023, 1029-32 (1973).
51. Note, supra note 50, at 1030-32.
52. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
53. See Folk & Moyer, supra note 50, at 764-65; Comment, supra note 50, at
350-55.
54. Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976); Aaron Ferer &
Sons Co. v. Berman, 431 F. Supp. 847 (D. Neb. 1977); In re Law Research Servs.,
Inc., 386 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
55. 433 U.S. at 194.
56. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, - Del. -, 361 A.2d 225, 230-35 (1976).
Although the court's primary emphasis was on Ownbey, it also discussed the affirmative
procedural safeguards the Delaware statute accorded the defendant.
57. 433 U.S. at 194 n.10.
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ture reliance on Ownbey for the proposition that the Constitution
imposes no procedural safeguards for the defendant in the foreign at-
tachment situation.
Shaffer's dictum that minimum contacts are required for asser-
tions of in rem jurisdiction may also deprive foreign attachments of
their status as one of the "extraordinary situation" exceptions of
Fuentes. Prior to Shaffer, it had been argued that states with long-
arm statutes had no governmental interest in foreign attachments. 58
Most pre-Shaffer court decisions rejected this contention, however,
either because of Fuentes' reference to Ownbey,59 or because the use
of the long-arm statute required an uncertain and potentially com-
plex minimum contacts analysis which could be avoided by the asser-
tion of quasi in rem jurisdiction. ° Shaffer, however, has weakened
both of these considerations. Justice Marshall's restrictive interpreta-
tion of Ownbey casts doubt on -the first. And the extension of Inter-
national Shoe to quasi in rem jurisdiction eliminates the second: since
Shaffer has mandated that the same kind of minimum contacts analy-
sis be made in quasi in rem as in in personam jurisdiction, the juris-
dictional analysis required of foreign attachments is now as uncertain
and as complex as that required of the long-arm statutes. Accordingly,
one court has already questioned the "extraordinary situation" status
of the foreign attachment, reasoning that since minimum contacts are
now required, "a state with a long-arm statute may have no govern-
mental interest in obtaining jurisdiction over nonresidents through
attachment."'
The importance of -the "extraordinary situation" exception to
foreign attachments has been limited, however, by changes in the
standards for all pre-judgment remedies since Fuentes. In Mitchell v.
W. T. Grant Co.,6 2 the Court held that an ex parte sequestration with-
out a pre-seizure hearing could be constitutional if sufficient post-
seizure safeguards for the defendant exist. While some commentators
have suggested that Mitchell should be limited to cases where the
58. See Folk & Moyer, supra note 50, at 763-65; Note, supra note 50, at
1034-36. Contra, Seidelson, Sniadach, Fuentes, Sub Chapter II and Foreign Attach-
ments, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 1, 29 n.77 (1974).
59. National Gen. Corp. v. Dutch Inns of America, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 3d 490, 496
n.4, 93 Cal. Rptr. 343, 347 n.4 (1971).
60. Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 456 F.2d 979, 982 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972).
61. Schreiber v. Republic Intermodal Corp., - Pa. , , 375 A.2d 1285, 1290
n.7 (1977).
62. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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plaintiff has some sort of pre-existing interest in the attached prop-
erty,63 the Court's explicit application of the Mitchell criteria in
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,64 where no pre-exist-
ing security interest existed, ignored this distinction. Thus, even if
foreign attachments are not "extraordinary situations," Di-Chem in-
dicates that they may be permitted without a pre-seizure hearing if
sufficient post-seizure safeguards exist. 5
These MitchellIDi-Chem procedural requirements may prove un-
workable, however, because of Shaffer's application of International
Shoe to quasi in rem jurisdiction. One of these requirements is that
the defendant be allowed an immediate post-seizure hearing wherein
the plaintiff must prove the grounds upon which the attachment was
allowed with the minimum contacts test.66 Since foreign attachments
63. See, e.g., Zammit, supra note 15, at 679.
64. 419 U.S. 601 (1975). See Brabham, supra note 41, at 177.
The necessary post-seizure safeguards have been interpreted to be:
(1) The writ of attachment must issue only upon an affidavit containing facts. The
affidavit must be by the creditor or his attorney who has personal knowledge of
the facts.
(2) The writ must be issuable by a judge or at least involve judicial participation.
(3) The creditor must be required to indemnify the debtor from the risk and damages
of a wrongful taking.
(4) The debtor must be able to dissolve the attachment by filing a bond.
(5) The debtor must be afforded an immediate post-seizure hearing wherein the
creditor shall have to prove the grounds upon which the writ was issued.
Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Berman, 431 F. Supp. 847, 852 (D. Neb. 1977). See also
Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1129-30 (3d Cir. 1976). It is not certain
that all of these safeguards must be present in order for an attachment without a pre-
seizure hearing to be valid. Some commentators have suggested that Mitchell mandates
that a more flexible balancing test be used. See, e.g., Note, Provisional Remedies and
Due Process in Default- Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 653.
Indeed, one commentator criticized Jonnet for not using a more flexible test such as
the one in Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1975). Note,
Foreign Attachment Power Constrained-An End to Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction?, 31 U.
MIAmi L. REv. 419, 431-32, 435 (1977). Indeed, even if the Mitchell criteria are
necessary, there is some doubt as to whether a judge or merely a competent official with
discretionary powers must be involved in the issuance of the writ of attachment. Com-
pare Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d at 1130 n.15 with Guzman v. Western State
Bank, 516 F.2d at 131 n.7. Not much more is certain than that "official seizures can be
constitutionally accomplished only with either 'notice . . . [and an] opportunity for a
hearing or other safeguard against mistaken taking.' " Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530
F.2d at 1129 (quoting North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606
(1975) ).
65. One commentator has suggested that the "extraordinary situation" exception
should now be ignored because it is unnecessary after Mitchell and Di-Chem. Brabham,
supra note 41, at 188. Both Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976).
and Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Berman, 431 F. Supp. 847 (D. Neb. 1977), applied the
Mitchell criteria to foreign attachments, and Jonnet hinted that these criteria would be
applied whether or not foreign attachments are "extraordinary situations." 530 F.2d at
1129 n.13.
66. This requirement was stressed by the Court in Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73
(1976) (per curiam), although as a matter of federalism, tht court ordered the lower
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must now pass muster under the minimum contacts test, the existence
of such contacts between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation
is a jurisdictional ground upon which the attachment is based. It
would therefore seem necessary67 that the plaintiff demonstrate such
contacts at the post-seizure hearing which, under Mitchell and Di-
Chem, must follow right on the heels of the attachment. 6 In many
cases it is difficult, if not impossible, to conduct quickly the kind of
discovery necessary to prove minimum contacts. 69 Thus all but the
most clearly constitutional assertions of quasi in rem jurisdiction
might be defeated by this time constraint.
The law concerning attachments, a volatile one in the past several
years, has thus been buffeted again by Shaffer. Just when Mitchell and
Di-Chem had at least begun to narrow the unsettled areas of the law,
a fundamental assumption-that presence of the res within the forum
was sufficient to establish at least a limited jurisdiction over the owner
-has been upset. The statutes and procedures, created on the basis
that assumption, are now of dubious constitutional validity and di-
minished practical value.
B. Jurisdiction Over Permanently Located Tangible Property
1. A per se rule conferring jurisdiction? The property seized in
Shaffer, shares in a Delaware corporation, was intangible and was lo-
cated in Delaware solely by operation of state law.70 By its nature this
property had few other contacts with Delaware. Thus the Court did
not consider whether some forms of property could ever, solely be-
cause of the contacts they suggest, provide the power to adjudicate an
unrelated claim. But Marshall's general analysis of jurisdiction indi-
cates that the mere presence of property, unrelated to the claim, can-
not support an assertion of jurisdiction. 1 Two of the concurring Jus-
tices took different views on this question. Justice Powell explicitly
reserved judgment, but argued -that the preservation of jurisdiction
court to abstain on the issue of whether the New York statute was constitutional until
it had been construed by the state courts.
67. If the plaintiff is not required to prove minimum contacts at the post-seizure
hearing, the defendant loses much of the procedural protection of this safeguard. The
plaintiff has taken his property without proving an essential component of the consti-
tutionality of the attachment.
68. One recently enacted statute requires that this hearing be held within five
days of the seizure. N.Y. Civ. PRac. LAW § 6211 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
69. Justice Brennan, in his opinion in Shaffer, stressed the need for proper dis-
covery when one makes a minimum contacts analysis. 433 U.S. at 221 (Brennan, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
70. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (rev. 1974).
71. 433 U.S. at 213-16.
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based upon ownership of real property within the forum state would
provide certainty and result in little unfairness. 72 He thus would cre-
ate a per se exception to the minimum contacts standard. Justice
Stevens, who concurred only in the judgment, would also permit juris-
diction based solely on the presence of permanently located, tangible
property, since the risk of being brought into court is foreseeable to
a nonresident owner of such property. Justice Stevens would also ap-
ply this foreseeability test to assertions of in rem jurisdiction involv-
ing intangible property.7 3 He suggests, however, that a nonresident
property owner would not foresee being held liable in an amount ex-
ceeding the value of his property.74
The positions taken by Justices Powell and Stevens have been
criticized as "narrow interpretations of Shaffer" that are inconsistent
"with the Court's reasoning or with jurisdiction theory as shaped by
International Shoe."75 Their positions, however, have three possible
justifications: first, -the certainty created by a per se rule concerning
ownership of permanently located, tangible property may outweigh
any possible unfairness; second, in cases involving real or other tangi-
ble property, sufficient contacts may always be present to justify the
assertion of jurisdiction; and third, a limited appearance, with its re-
duced potential liability, may justify sustaining in rem jurisdiction
with fewer contacts than are required for in personam jurisdiction.
The argument that a per se rule would avoid the uncertainty of
the minimum contacts test now seems doctrinally untenable. The ma-
jority specifically subrogated the certainty of the old in rem rules to
the reasonableness standard of International Shoe,70 despite Powell's
limitation of his proposed per se rule to certain forms of property
which would make an unreasonable assertion of jurisdiction un-
likely.77
The second justification for a per se rule, the contacts suggested
by the presence of immovable property in a state, has been advocated
most strongly in the case of real property. The concurrences of Jus-
72. Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 217-19 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens' analysis was followed in a
recently decided case involving the attachment of a bank account. See Feder v. Turkish
Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
74. 433 U.S. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).
75. The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 70, 158-59 (1977).
76. 433 U.S. at 211. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 75, at
159-60. See also Carrington, supra note 12, at 309.
77. This point is buttressed by the escheat cases in which the Court did apply a
per se jurisdictional situs rule. See, e.g., Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
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tice Powell and Justice Stevens singled out real estate ownership as
uniquely justifying assertions of jurisdiction over nonresidents."" One
commentator has supported this view by pointing out that personal
jurisdiction has been upheld under the International Shoe standard
in cases involving single acts of the defendant which constituted far
less substantial contact with the forum state than the continuous own-
ership of real property.1 9 This commentator suggests, however, that
real property not be deemed a proper basis of jurisdiction if the cause
of action has no connection with the forum, since such an assertion
of jurisdiction would not be "consonant with the reasonable expecta-
tions of the defendant .. .,.
The third justification for the application of a per se rule is the
special protection which the limited appearance offers the defendant
in a quasi in rem action. Justice Powell qualified his advocacy of such
a rule to quasi in rem actions which offer such protection.,' Presum-
ably, they felt that the limited liability afforded by the limited ap-
pearance justifies a lowering of the quantum of contacts required by
the minimum contacts standard.* In such a case, the mere ownership
of real property might then provide a substantial enough connection
with the state to justify the assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
2. Is the limited appearance useful after Shaffer? Traditionally,
the primary purpose of allowing the defendant to make a limited ap-
pearance was to mitigate the potential unfairness to the defendant of
basing jurisdiction solely on the presence of his property in -the forum
state.8 2 Shaffer ended jurisdiction which was based solely on property,
78. 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
79. Note, Ownership, Possession or Use of Property as a Basis of In Personam
Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. Rav. 374, 377 (1959). See also Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H.
294, 298, 319 A.2d 626, 629 (1974). "The State has a clear interest in providing a
forum for adjudicating rights in property located within its borders because the avail-
ability of legal procedures to determine such rights is necessary to enable the society to
function in an orderly fashion." Id.
80. Note, supra note 79, at 378. Accord, Comment, supra note 15, at 338.
81. 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring) Justice Stevens endorsed Justice
Powell's views without specifically mentioning the role of the limited appearance. Id. at
219 (Stevens, J., concurring).
82. See Currie, Attachment and Garnishment in the Federal Courts, 59 MicH. L.
R.v. 337, 379-80 (1961); Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in
the United States, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 44, 56, 60 (1962). Where limited appearances
were not permitted the defendant was faced with a dilemma. He had the choice of either
defaulting and losing his property, or defending on the merits and submitting to the
general jurisdiction of the court. This general appearance could result in liability for a
judgment in excess of the value of the defendant's property in the state. See, e.g., United
States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956); Robinson v. Loyola Foundation,
Inc., 236 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). To avoid this unfairness, a number of
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and thus eliminated the humanitarian rationale for the limited ap-
pearance. Since Delaware law does not permit limited appearances, s3
it is unclear whether -the Court in Shaffer would have rejected the
limited appearance as a factor in determining whether jurisdiction
should be asserted. Dicta in the majority opinion suggests that the
majority would have done so. 4 On the other hand, Justice Powell en-
dorsed .the use of the limited appearance as a justification for some
assertions of jurisdiction based solely on the presence of the defend-
ant's property in the forum state.85
But if a limited appearance is now to serve as a factor in deter-
mining whether minimum contacts exist, it will serve a very different
purpose than it did before Shaffer. If sufficient contacts exist to justify
courts have ruled that defendants should not be coerced into this choice and have
allowed limited appearances. E.g., Dry Clime Lamp Corp. v. Edwards, 389 F.2d 590(5th Cir. 1968); Fount Wip, Inc. v. Golstein, 33 Cal. App. 3d 184, 108 Cal. Rptr.
732, 736 (1973). Some of the leading proponents of extending the minimum contacts
test to in rem actions also had endorsed the limited appearance as an interim measure
to reduce the unfairness of jurisdiction based on property alone. See, e.g., Hazard, supra
note 15, at 281-88; Von Mehren & Trantman, supra note 15, at 1135, 1164.
In a jurisdiction which allows a limited appearance, a defendant may defend on
the merits in an in rem action without subjecting himself to personal liability. He par-
ticipates in the action to defend his interest in the property on which jurisdiction rests.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGEMENTS § 40 (1942). The plaintiff in such a jurisdiction is not
barred from relitigating the controversy in another forum. Cheshire Nat'l Bank v.
Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916). Any damages awarded are not merged into
the judgment, but are instead deducted from any award in a later action on the same
claim. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 75, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 1
1973). A trial in which the defendant entered a limited appearance might, however,
have some collateral estoppel effects. The parties involved might be prevented from re-
contesting any issues of fact which were fully litigated. Taintor, Foreign Judgments In
Rem; Full Faith and Credit v. Res Judicata In Personam, 8 U. PiTT. L. Rnv. 223, 234
(1942). Some courts might also bar the parties from raising any legal issue which was
litigated at the first trial, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 75, comment a
(Tent. Draft No. 1 1973), and for example, a defendant might be precluded from
raising a defense if it was raised at the first trial.
83. Sands v. Lefcourt Realty, 35 Del. Ch. 340, 117 A.2d 365 (1955).
84. 433 U.S. at 207 n.23. "The fairness of subjecting a defendant to state courtjurisdiction does not depend on the size of the claim being litigated." Accord, id. at
209 n.33. While Marshall was discussing the ability of a defendant in in rem litigation
to limit his losses to the amount of property in the forum by defaulting, the limited
appearance just extends this option and allows a defendant to defend on the merits
without making a general appearance.
On the other hand, Marshall cited with approval a commentator whose main thesis
is that limited liability should affect the standards used in evaluating the assertion of
in rem jurisdiction.
Id. at 208 n.30 (citing Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting
Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 600 (1977) ).
85. 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring). justice Stevens endorsed Justice
Powell's views. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring). See The Supreme Court, 1976
Term, supra note 75, at 157-58.
SHAFFER V. HEITNER
jurisdiction without consideration of the limited appearance as a fac-
tor in the minimum contact analysis, then the limited appearance be-
comes a bonus for the defendant. He receives the benefit of the lim-
ited appearance, although the harshness which originally justified its
use is no longer a threat after Shaffer. If, however, the limited appear-
ance is used to lower the quantum of contacts necessary to assert juris-
diction, the plaintiff becomes the beneficiary of the doctrine, since he
can bring his action in a forum from which the action would be pre-
cluded were the limited appearance not permitted.
A doctrine which makes -the plaintiff's task of obtaining jurisdic-
tion easier seems less important than one which serves to mitigate the
harshness of in rem jurisdiction for the defendant,"6 and may not be
justified in light of the burdens which such jurisdiction would im-
pose on some defendants. The defendant must still enter the forum
to litigate the cause of action. He thus incurs the same litigation ex-
penses and inconveniences as if he were subject to in personam juris-
diction-assuming he decides not to default. The similarity of the
burdens imposed by litigating in a general and a limited appearance
suggests that uniform standards should apply to the assertion of both
kinds of jurisdiction.87 Furthermore, the limited appearance has been
criticized as an unnecessary burden on the judicial system, since it
permits two adjudications of -the same controversy, creating the pos-
sibility of conflicting decisions and unnecessary waste of the judicial
system's scarce resources. 8
After Shaffer, the limited appearance does not seem to serve a
strong jurisdictional purpose. While the judicial economy arguments
against the limited appearance were not affected by Shaffer, the origi-
nal purposes have been undermined. If sufficient contacts between the
forum and the defendant exist to support jurisdiction without its
consideration, it is superfluous-an archaic shield against an extinct
threat. Since the defendant is no less inconvenienced by defending on
the merits in a limited appearance -than in a general appearance, it
86. See Smit, supra note 84, at 608, for the contention, from a strong advocate
of a broad minimum contacts standard, that the defendant's interests are more important
than the plaintiff's.
87. 1 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN, A. MILLER, NEw YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, 320. 16
(1977).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956); Blume,
Actions Quasi in Rem Under Section 1655, Title 28, U.S.C., 50 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 22-24
(1951). In practice, however, few cases have been litigated twice because of the limited
appearances. For an example of such a case, see Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Sternberg
Dredging Co., 189 Miss. 73, 191 So. 94 (1939).
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seems unfair to lower the quantum of contacts required when a lim-
ited appearance is permitted. The only one who benefits from such
a reduction is the plaintiff, but his gain seems not to outweigh the
defendant's inconvenience.
3. Conclusion. The justifications suggested for allowing a forum
to assert jurisdiction solely on the basis of the defendant's ownership
of real or tangible property in 'the forum state are of dubious strength.
The greater certainty that such a rule would provide was expressly
subrogated to considerations of fairness by Shaffer. That mere owner-
ship of such property gives rise to a presumption of adequate contacts
with the forum to sustain jurisdiction seems questionable, especially
where the controversy is unrelated to the forum. The limited appear-
ance, once the protector of the defendant in the quasi in rem action,
is now an obsolete vestige of a discredited form of jurisdiction. Thus
a per se rule seems inappropriate, especially so soon after Shaffer has
opened the windows wide to considerations of fairness and reasonable-
ness. It would seem appropriate at this time for the courts to take a
fresh look at the kinds of action that have traditionally been litigated
under quasi in rem jurisdiction, to scrutinize them for essential fair-
ness, and only then to consider the application of per se rules.
C. The Seider Doctrine After Shaffer v. Heitner
The Seider doctrine is a particular exercise of quasi in rem juris-
diction first successfully used in Seider v. Roth.89 In that case the New
York Court of Appeals upheld the assertion of quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant who was alleged to have tortiously
injured the plaintiff in an out-of-state automobile accident. The in-
tangible property attached was the contractual debt owed by the auto-
mobile liability insurance company to the insured defendant to de-
fend and indemnify him.90
The constitutionality of this controversial jurisdictional device,
despite affirmation by the New York Court of Appeals91 and the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals,92 is again under attack as a result of
89. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
90. Id. at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
91. Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977)
(Seider limited to resident plaintiffs); Neuman v. Dunham, 39 N.Y.2d 999, 355 N.E.2d
294, 387 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1976) (mem.) (Seider affirmed on the ground of stare decisis
alone); Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633
(1967).
92. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, aff'd en bane, 410 F.2d 117 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). The Second Circuit has recently upheld
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Shaffer v. Heitner. Shaffer has shifted the primary focus of criticism
of the Seider doctrine from that of statutory construction 93 to analysis
of the contacts among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation
in the Seider situation.
The first post-Shaffer observations left little doubt that Seider was
no longer viable.94 This conclusion was premature, however, because
litigation challenging Seider has not been completely successful. In
O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.,95 Seider jurisdiction was sustained
on a finding by the district court that the insurance attachment was
in reality a judicially-created direct action,96 and in conjunction with
the procedural safeguards required for its use,97 did not "offend the
policy considerations underlying Shaffer."""
Most recent New York Supreme Court decisions, however, have
agreed with the predictions that Seider is no longer valid.99 They have
Seider in a post-Shaffer opinion, O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., No. 78-7050 (2d
Cir., June 12, 1978).
93. The Seider court permitted attachment of the insured's right to be indemni-
fied and defended by the insurer as a 'debt' within the meaning of CPLR § 5201. See
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5201(a) (McKinney 1963). This triggered a flurry of critical
commentary almost unanimously rejecting this interpretation of § 5201. One of the
earliest, and certainly most persistent critics in this area has been Professor Siegel. See
Siegel, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5201 (McKinney
Supp. Pamphlet 1964-1977). Courts in states that have rejected the Seider action have
relied almost exclusively on statutory interpretation to find attachment inappropriate.
The last pre-Shaffer state court rejection occurred in California. See Javorek v.
Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976). Shaffer
has not, however, ended criticism of this interpretation of § 5201. See Katz v. Umansky,
92 Misc. 2d 285, 290, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412, 416 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (the obligation to de-
fend and indemnify remains inchoate until jurisdiction has been acquired over the
insured, therefore attachment for jurisdiction is precluded under § 5201(a) ); Siegel,
Article of Special Interest: In Rem and Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 400 N.Y.S.2d 25,
37-38 (1978) (Seider deserves blame for its lawlessness because it authorizes the levy
of inchoate rights, a levy which § 5201 (a) forbids).
94. "[I]t is difficult to escape the conclusion that under Shaffer v. Heitner, the
Seider principle cannot survive." McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 178 N.Y.L.J. at
2, col. 3 (Sept. 9, 1977). "It is fair to say that [the Seider] type of jurisdiction has been
wiped out." Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction-Supreme Court Nullifies Seider v. Roth, NEw
YORK STATE L. DIG., (Mid-June 1977).
95. 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, No. 78-7050 (2d Cir., June 12,
1978).
96. 437 F. Supp. at 1001. A direct action is one in which the injured party sues
the insurer directly, thus circumventing the usual requirement that the injured procure
a judgment against the insured before proceeding against the insurer.
97. Jurisdiction is exercised (a) only in favor of resident plaintiffs; (b) only
against insurers which have in personam minimum contacts with New York; (c) only
after giving adequate notice to the insured. Further, the defendant is not precluded
from relitigating the merits of the case if there is a subsequent suit. Id. at 1004. See
note 82 supra.
98. 437 F. Supp. at 1004.
99. Attanasio v. Ferre, 401 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Wallace v. Target
Store, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454, 400 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Katz v. Umansky, 92
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rejected the analysis of Seider jurisdiction as a direct action against
the insurer, 100 and found the liability insurance policy, the only con-
tact between the named nonresident defendant and the New York
forum, to be unrelated to the cause of action' 01 and by itself insuffi-
cient to sustain jurisdiction. 102 The first Appellate Division decision
on the subject, Alford v. McGaw, 03 disagreed. In upholding the
Seider doctrine, the court found that the presence of the insurer's
debt and other ties between the defendant and the New York forum
established sufficient contacts to permit jurisdiction.'04 This finding
was based on the realization that the insurer, present in the state,
plays the critical role in handling the litigation for ,the defendant, and
that the attachment of the contractual debt arises only because of its
relation to the underlying cause of action. 0 5 The court came to this
conclusion without finding Seider to be a direct action, but rather
merely to have the "effect" of being one. 06
The future of the Seider doctrine is presently an open question.
The preliminary litigation in New York indicates that perhaps the
key to Seider's future is whether it will be treated as a direct action,
with the insurer viewed as the actual defendant, rather than as a pure
attachment process against the property of the named defendant. How-
ever, threshold examination must be directed at the standard by which
Shaffer determines constitutionally allowable quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion. The Shaffer standard is the hurdle that Seider must overcome,
whether it is labelled an attachment device or direct action.
1. The Shaffer minimum contacts standard. Justice Marshall,
writing for the majority in Shaffer, concluded -that "all assertions of
Misc. 2d 285, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Kennedy v. Deroker, 91 Misc. 2d
648, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 1977). Contra, Rodriguez v. Wolfe, 93 Misc. 2d 364,
401 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
100. Wallace v. Target Store, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454, 459, 400 N.Y.S.2d 478, 482
(Sup. Ct. 1977); Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 290, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412, 416 (Sup.
Ct. 1977). In Kennedy v. Deroker the court explicitly avoided the direct action issue.
91 Misc. 2d 648, 651, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630 (Sup. Ct. 1977). See note 96 supra for
an explanation of the direct action.
101. Wallace v. Target Store, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454, 458, 400 N.Y.S.2d 478, 481
(Sup. Ct. 1977).
102. Attanasio v. Ferre, 401 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Wallace v.
Target Store, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454 ,458, 400 N.Y.S.2d 478, 481 (Sup. Ct. 1977);
Katz v. Uroansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 290, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412, 416, (Sup. Ct. 1977);
Kennedy v. Deroker, 91 Misc. 2d 648, 650, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
Contra, Rodriguez v. Wolfe, 93 Misc. 2d 364, 367 401 N.Y.S.2d 442, 444 (Sup. Ct.
1978) ("the insurance policy is at the heart of plaintiff's cause of action").
103. 61 A.D.2d 504, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499 (4th Dept. 1978).
104. Id. at 507, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
105. Id. at 508, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
106. Id. at 509, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
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state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards
set forth in International Shoe and its progeny,' ' 07 with primary em-
phasis upon the contacts among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.08 The Court said that sufficient contacts would exist when
the property within the forum is itself the cause of controversy. 0 9 The
defendant's ownership of property within the forum and the contro-
versy concerning that property would normally indicate that the de-
fendant expected to benefit from state protection of his interest."0
However, -the quasi in rem jurisdiction found in Harris v. Balk'"-
was all but explicitly overruled. The presence of property unrelated
to the plaintiff's cause of action, without the existence of other ties
between the forum and the defendant, no longer supports jurisdic-
tion.112
Shaffer's application of International Shoe to in rem proceedings
evinced a concern primarily for the contacts between the defendant
and the forum. Shaffer stressed the lack of evidence that the defend-
ants had ever set foot in Delaware," 8 or -that they had other contacts
with the forum that might result in an expectation that they would be
summoned before a Delaware court.114 These deficiencies overshad-
owed any interest that -the state might have in the litigation stemming
from the defendants' position as corporate fiduciaries in a Delaware
corporation,"15 or from the need to apply Delaware law to litigation
concerning the management of Delaware corporations." 6 Shaffer, by
emphasizing the physical presence of the defendant and his ability to
foresee the forum state's assertion of jurisdiction, subordinated the in-
terests of the plaintiff and the state.":7 State interests were discussed in
Shaffer, but they were clearly secondary; the interests of the plaintiff
were ignored altogether.
The majority's emphasis of the defendant's role in jurisdictional
analysis was questioned by Justice Brennan, who in a concurring and
107. 433 U.S. at 212 (footnote omitted).
108. 433 U.S. at 204, 207.
109. Id. at 207-08.
110. Id.
111. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). Harris has been characterized as the foundation upon
which Seider is built. Siegel, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
LAW § 5201 at 17 (McKinney Supp. Pamphlet 1964-1977). But see note 216 & accom-
panying text infra.
112. 433 U.S. at 208-09.
113. Id. at 213.
114. Id. at 216.
115. Id. at 215-16.
116. Id. at 216.
117. Casad, supra note 12, at 74-76.
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dissenting opinion, placed less weight on the contact of the defendant
with the forum and more on the state's valid substantive interests.118
As one example of such an interest he cited the forum's concern in
assuring restitution for its own residents. 119 He also felt that applica-
tion of the International Shoe test should include the forum's con-
tacts with ,the plaintiff. 120 Justice Brennan's approach resembles that
of McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.12' In McGee, the Su-
preme Court permitted personal jurisdiction to be asserted over an
insurance company that had transacted no business within the forum
other than the sale, by mail, of the single policy contract at issue. 122
State interest in providing redress for its residents 23 and in regulating
insurance contracts'24 were the substantial connections between the
litigation and the forum -that persuaded the Court that the exercise
of jurisdiction was fair. The presence of the single contract of the in-
surer in the state was sufficient to allow the Court to invoke these
state interests.125
The Shaffer majority's approach, unlike that of Justice Brennan,
has a distinctive Hanson v. Denckla 26 flavor. In Hanson, however, the
Court required the defendant's contact with the forum to be coupled
with some act by which -the defendant "purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus in-
voking the benefits and protection of its laws.' 27 Minimum contacts
were found to be absent because the defendant neither had offices lo-
cated in the state, nor had transacted business there.128
118. 433 U.S. at 223-25 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
119. Id. at 223 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
120. Id. at 225 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
121. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
122. Zammit, supra note 15, at 674.
123. 355 U.S. at 223 (1957).
124. Developments, supra note 15, at 928.
125. "It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a
contract which had substantial connection with that State. . . . The contract was de-
livered in California, the premiums were mailed from there . . . ." 355 U.S. at 223
(1957). See Smit, Common and Civil Law Rules of In Personam Adjudicatory Au-
thority: An Analysis of Underlying Policies, 21 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 335, 351 (1972).
126. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The contrast between Hanson and McGee stems from
an ambiguity latent in International Shoe. Casad, supra note 12, at 77.
127. 357 U.S. at 253.
128. Id. at 251. The Hanson and McGee minimum contacts standards do not by
any means exhaust the possible judicial approaches to applying the precepts of Inter-
national Shoe. See Comment, supra note 15, at 314-16, which discusses five separate
approaches to the International Shoe standard found in the case law. The Shaffer
opinion hints that a different test might be applied to a natural person. "The differ-
ences between individuals and corporations may, of course, lead to the conclusion that
a given set of circumstances establishes State jurisdiction over one type of defendant
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Although most application of the International Shoe minimum
contacts analysis have involved assertions of in personam jurisdiction,
there are some pre-Shaffer cases that applied the analysis to assertions
of quasi in rem jurisdiction. These cases reveal a trend of thought
which culminated in the Shaffer decision and, when combined with
the broad principles of Shaffer, help to provide a consistent standard
by which Seider and other quasi in rem schemes may be judged. For
example Judge Gibbons, in a concurring opinion in Jonnet v. Dollar
Savings Bank,12 9 recognized two different aspects of the International
Shoe standard and characterized them as "twin limitations upon the
scope of state judicial power."'83° One limitation was that the state
must have some palpable interest in the controversy, an interest that
is connected with public policy. The second limitation was that the
parties have sufficient contacts with the forum to justify the forum's
assertion of jurisdiction over them.' 3 ' Significantly, he made it clear
that the contacts between the defendant and the forum are to be
primary in the jurisdictional inquiry. 32 In U.S. Industries, Inc. v.
Gregg, 3 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a use of the
same Delaware sequestration statute struck down in Shaffer a year
later. The majority relied on Judge Gibbons' analysis in Jonnet and
applied International Shoe to the quasi in rem action. 34 The only
contacts -that the parties had with the forum were the Delaware in-
corporation of the plaintiff corporation and the fictional status of the
defendant's stock in the state. 3 5 Although Gregg can be read as plac-
ing the residency of the plaintiff and the strength of state interests in
protecting its citizens on an equal footing with the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum, 3 6 the Delaware District Court subsequently re-
but not over the other." 433 U.S. at 204 n.19. It has also been proposed that Hanson's
preference for the defendant's interests be reversed when the action involves a localized
plaintiff against a multi-state defendant. See Comment, supra note 15, at 314-15.
Another approach would assign equal importance to all the interests of the parties and
the State. Id. at 315-16; Developments, supra note 15, at 923-48.
129. 530 F.2d 1123 (3rd Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 1140 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
131. Id. (Gibbons, J., concurring).
132. "Simply stated, plaintiff contacts cannot cure a jurisdictional defect that
derives from a lack of defendant contacts with the forum." Id. at 1141 (Gibbons, J.,
concurring).
133. 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
134. Id. at 154.
135. Id. at 155.
136. Id. Note, however, that the court in Gregg did not find this to be the case,
but only hypothesized the relevance of the plaintiff's contacts, and then deemed them
insufficient to support jurisdiction. Id. n.9. For an analysis of Gregg that interprets the
court's opinion as according substantial weight to the plaintiff's residence and the state's
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lied on Gregg to preclude, mainly on the basis of insufficient contacts
between the defendant and the forum, an assertion of quasi in rem
jurisdiction . 37
These decisions anticipated Shaffer, both in applying the Inter-
national Shoe standard to quasi in rem jurisdiction and in emphasiz-
ing the contacts of the defendant with the forum. The courts required
that the contacts be physical or purposeful, as mandated by Hanson.
The contact of the plaintiff with the forum, the fictional location of
the intangible debt, the limited liability of the defendant, the burden
to the defendant of litigating in a foreign jurisdiction, and the state
interests in the litigation were relevant, but were assigned an inferior
position in the hierarchy.
Once the contact of the defendant with the forum is satisfied, the
minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe is met. But In-
ternational Shoe imposes a second requirement: that the forum be a
fair and reasonable place to litigate.188 It is in the application of this
test that these other criteria, including the contacts between the plain-
tiff and the forum, and 'the extent of the defendant's liability, are im-
portant.3 9
2. Seider as a quasi in rem attachment. If Seider jurisdiction is
viewed as relying only on the attachment of an intangible res within
the forum,140 without reference to its direct-action qualities, the post-
Shaffer pessimism of the commentators about the future of Seider
seems justified.14' In the typical Seider situation, the defendant is a
nonresident insured whose only contact with the forum is the attached
insurance policy debt, owed to the policyholder by the insurer. 42
interest in the litigation, see Note, U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Gregg; Due Process Limits A
State's Power to Fix the Situs of Intangibles for Purposes of Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction,
38 U. PTT. L. REv. 789, 802-03 (1977).
137. Barber-Greene Co. v. Walco National Corp., 428 F. Supp. 567 (D. Del.
1977). The court specifically discussed the significant interest that the State of Dela-
ware had in the litigation. "[T]he litigation here involves the relationship between a
Delaware corporation and its shareholders .... The ... distinction [between this case
and Gregg] is that [here] Delaware has a greater interest and . . . more significant con-
tacts with a dispute.. . ." Id. at 570-71.
138. 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
139. Strachan, In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 235, 256
(1977). But see Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), a
post-Shaffer decision, where the court found a bank account in New York sufficient
entry into the jurisdiction to allow for quasi in rem jurisdiction. Analysis was made of
neither the interests of the plaintiff nor of the forum.
140. The view taken by the courts ia Attanasio v. Ferre, 401 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup.
Ct. 1977); Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1977);
Kennedy v. Deroker, 91 Misc. 2d 648, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
141. See note 94 supra.
142. 7A J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN, & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTIE
§ 6202.06a at 62-50.10 (1977).
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Shaffer makes it clear that the attached property is, in and of itself,
an inadequate contact with the forum when it is completely unre-
lated to the cause of action and when it does not suggest the existence
of other ties between the defendant and the state.14 3 If the insurer is
not viewed as the actual defendant, the Seider action does not present
the named defendant's physical presence in the forum, his expectation
of suit there, nor any purposeful act which he may have committed
there. 44 Several New York courts, however, have justified Seider ac-
tions in light of Shaffer by stressing the relationship of the attached
insurance policy debt, to defend and indemnify the insured, to the
cause of action. The relationship is predicated upon the occurrence of
the accident, which establishes the existence of both the debt and the
cause of action. 14 5 Although the strength of this relationship has been
questioned by other New York courts, 46 it is probably less critical to
a post-Shaffer analysis than the courts have assumed. 4 7 In a Seider
action, the relationship of the attached property to the cause of action
is not indicative of any expectation by the insured defendant to bene-
fit from New York State protection of his interest in the property. The
out-of-state purchase of an insurance policy by a nonresident defend-
ant could not provide any basis for the insured to believe that he
would have to defend, in New York, against an alleged tort that oc-
curred elsewhere. This is true whether or not the insurance company
is doing business in New York at the time when it sold the defendant
the policy. Without this expectation, the importance of the relation-
ship between the attached property and the cause of action dimin-
ishes, 48 since the purpose of the minimum contacts test, which the
143. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977); Attanasio v. Ferre, 401
N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Wallace v. Target Store, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454, 456,
400 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 290, 399
N.Y.S.2d 412, 416 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Kennedy v. Deroker, 91 Misc. 2d 648, 650, 398
N.Y.S.2d 628, 630 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
144. Comment, supra note 15, at 333.
145. Alford v. McGaw, 61 A.D.2d 504, 508, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499, 502 (4th Dept.
1978). See Rodriguez v. Wolfe, 93 Misc. 2d 364, 367, 401 N.Y.S.2d 442, 444 (Sup.
Ct. 1978) ("the insurance policy is at the heart of the plaintiff's cause of action").
146.
[I]t is still clear that the insurance policy is not at the heart of the plaintiff's
cause of action in negligence. The sole relationship of the policy is to satisfy
any potential judgment. For all intents and purposes it is as unrelated to
the cause of action as the sequestered stock was in.. . Shaffer ....
Wallace v. Target Store, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454, 458, 400 N.Y.S.2d 478, 481 (Sup.
Ct. 1977). See Attanasio v. Ferre, 401 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Katz v.
Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 289-90, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412, 416 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Kennedy
v. Deroker, 91 Misc. 2d 648, 650, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
147. But see O'Conor v- Lee-Hy Paving Corp., No. 78-7050 (2d Cir., June 12,
1977).
148. Shaffer v .Heitner, 433 U.S. at 207-08.
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relationship is said to satisfy, is to assure that the defendant not be
brought before a forum in a state the laws of which the defendant
has not purposely availed himself.14 Further, the Shaffer majority
seems to have considered this relationship important only in cases in-
volving the attachment of tangible property, or at least property of
marketable value. 50 Absent additional ties between the defendant and
the forum, the attached insurance policy by itself is too tenuous upon
which to ground jurisdiction.' 5 '
Prior to Shaffer, courts had upheld the constitutionality of the
Seider doctrine without resort to the theory that Seider authorizes a
direct action. These courts relied, however, upon a number of juris-
dictional grounds that after Shaffer no longer seem valid. In Simpson
v. Loehmann,5 2 the mere presence in New York of the insurance com-
pany's debt-to defend and indemnify the insured-was found to ful-
fill due process requirements for quasi in rem jurisdiction. The court
based this primarily on the rationale of Harris v. Balk. 58 Shaffer, how-
ever, overrules Harris to the extent that the location of the debt in
the forum alone is insufficient contact between the defendant and the
state to permit jurisdiction. 54 Minichiello v. Rosenberg5 upheld
Seider for two reasons. First, it found that the burden Seider imposed
upon the defendant was minimized by the procedural protection af-
forded him by a limited appearance.' 0 Second, Minichiello empha-
sized the forum's interest in protecting its residents. 57 But these fac-
tors are not controlling absent a showing that the principal require-
ment of Shaffer, that there be sufficient contact between the defendant
and the forum, is met. 58
Seider, when viewed as a quasi in rem attachment procedure
against the named defendant, cannot provide the necessary contacts
149. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251-52 (1958).
150. 433 U.S. at 208 & n.25.
151. But see Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In
this post-Shaffer case, quasi in rem jurisdiction was permitted on thee basis of only a
single contact with the forum: a bank account unrelated to the cause of action. The
court found that the bank account of the defendant, voluntarily opened in the further-
ance of defendant's business, placed it on notice of the possibility of its having to
defend such property in the foreign forum. Id. at 1278-79.
152. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
153. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
154. See text accompanying notes 111-12 supra.
155. 410 F.2d 106, aff'd en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 844 (1969).
156. Id. at 111.
157. Id. at 110.
158. See text accompanying notes 129-39 supra.
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the Shaffer standard requires. Seider will probably fail as an exercise
of jurisdiction if the role of the insurer is ignored.
3. Seider as a direct action against the insurer. The "first step
[toward] extruding Seider through the narrow opening of the Shaffer
case" is to view the insurance company as the real party in interest
on the defendant's side.159 From this perspective, Seider permits a di-
rect action, thus circumventing the usual practice that the insurer sub-
mit to suit by injured parties only after judgment is obtained against
the insured defendant. 60 The significance of labelling Seider a direct
action is that it shifts analysis of the first prong of the Shaffer standard
away from the contacts of the insured with the forum to those between
the insurer and the forum.' 61
The federal courts have readily construed Seider as a direct ac-
tion. They have found that "[t]he insurer doing business in New York
is . . . the real party in interest and the nonresident insured . . .
[acts] simply as a conduit, who has to be named as a defendant in or-
der to provide a conceptual basis for getting at the insurer."'162 The
New York courts have not embraced the direct action concept so read-
ily. In Seider, the court of appeals was ambiguous: "[a direct action
would be established] to the extent only that affirmance [of the judg-
ment below] will put jurisdiction in New York State and require the
insurer to defend here .. .because by its policy it has agreed to de-
fend in any place where jurisdiction is obtained against its insured."'16 3
In Simpson v. Loehmann,64 the majority conceded that realistically the
insurer was in "full control of the litigation," but did not character-
ize the suit as a direct action. 65 In a recent case, Donawitz v. Danek,166
159. Siegel, supra note 111, at 18.
160. Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational Conflict-of-Law Problems,
74 HARV. L. Rav. 357, 357 (1960). Five states have statutes that permit the direct action
suit. See ARIC. STAT. ANN. § 66-3244 (1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-612 (1975); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1978); R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-7-2 (1956); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 260.11(1) (West Supp. 1968). Direct actions have also been judicially created
in several states, as an adjunct to compulsory insurance for motor vehicles, on the ground
that legislative intent to permit such actions can be inferred from the primary purpose
of the insurance requirement, that the injured party be protected. See Note, supra, at
358.
161. See Siegel, supra note 111, at 18.
162. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 109, aff'd en banc, 410 F.2d 117
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving
Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 1001 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd No. 78-7050 (2d Cir., June 12,
1978).
163. 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
164. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
165. Id. at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637. In a concurring opinion,
Judge Keating was willing to admit the direct action basis of Seider. "Although no
direct action is presently in effect [in New York], I see no policy reason for not holding
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the court of appeals seemed finally willing to admit that it had indeed
created a direct action. 167 This interpretation of Donawitz is not uni-
versally shared in New York, however, since two lower courts have
found that Donawitz did not construe Seider as a direct action," 8 and
at least one other lower court has since insisted that the Seider doc-
trine is not predicated on the direct-action theory. 169
It has been argued that section 167 (1) (b) of the New York In-
surance Law170 precludes the Court of Appeals from creating a direct
action against insurers.' 7 ' Section 167, enforceable against insurers, re-
quires that each insurance policy contract sold in the State of New
York permit an injured plaintiff to sue the defendant insurer directly
once the plaintiff has obtained a valid judgment against the insured. 172
Thus section 167 seems to allow the insurance companies to state that,
as a condition precedent to a direct action by an injured plaintiff, the
plaintiff must obtain a judgment against the insured. This apparent
statutory authorization of the condition precedent is the basis of the
conclusion, reached by some, that the judiciary has no power 'to create
a direct action for the injured plaintiff who has not obtained a judg-
ment against the insured. 73
This analysis of the effects of section 167 ignores, however, the
framework within which the critical language of 'the statute is found.
Section 167, by placing an affirmative duty upon insurers to include
a specific provision in their contracts, makes some plaintiffs, those
with judgments against insureds, third party beneficiaries of the in-
surance contracts. But section 167 does not purport to make these
that service of process on the real party defendant-the insurer-is sufficient to compel
it to defend in this State . . . ." Id. at 313, 334 N.E.2d at 673, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
166. 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977).
167. "Moreover, . . . [the Seider court] in effect established, by judicial fiat, a
'direct action' against the insurer. . . . Thus, this court did indirectly that which the
Legislature could have done, but failed to do, directly ... " Id. at 142, 366 N.E.2d
at 255, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
168. Alford v. McGaw, 61 A.D.2d 504, 509, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499, 503 (4th Dept.
1978); Wallace v. Target Store, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454, 459, 400 N.Y.S.2d 478, 482
(Sup. Ct. 1977).
169. Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 290, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412, 416 (Sup. Ct.
1977).
170. N.Y. INS. LAW § 167 (McKinney 1966).
171. Alford v. McGaw, 61 A.D.2d 504, 509, 401 N.Y.S.2d 499, 503 (4th Dept.
1978); D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE 130 (1978).
172. Thus the courts have held that a valid judgment against the insured is a
prerequisite to bringing a cause of action under the Insurance Law. See McNamara v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 3 A.D.2d 295, 299, 160 N.Y.S.2d 51, 55 (1957); Sandak v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 202 N.Y.S.2d 47, 48 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Bornhurst v. Massachuetts Bonding
& Ins. Co., 12 Misc. 2d 149, 151, 175 N.Y.S.2d 542, 545 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
173. See note 171 supra.
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plaintiffs the only third party beneficiaries of insurance contracts, nor
does it expressly authorize insurance companies to exclude plaintiffs
who have not obtained judgments in their favor from third party
beneficiary status. Furthermore, a reading of 167 as limiting the abil-
ity of the judiciary to create a direct action for the benefit of plain-
tiffs without judgments ignores two important facts.174 First, it is pos-
sible for the courts to find implied contractual terms granting rights
to third parties. Second, contract is not the sole source of a plaintiff's
rights. Since section 167 is merely a requirement that insurance con-
tracts protect some third parties, it seems unreasonable to construe it
as prohibiting actions by other third parties based upon grounds other
than the contractual term.
Seider can be seen as a judicial extension of a legislatively-created
right. The justification for this extension is that the Court of Appeals
was confronted with a problem that the Insurance Law seems not to
have anticipated: the New York resident plaintiff who faces the pros-
pect of litigating in an inconvenient forum an action in which the
defense is controlled by an insurer who might just as readily litigate
in New York as in the defendant's home state. Judicial extensions of
existing rights and creation of entirely new rights are neither novel
nor precluded by separation-of-powers considerations, at least where
the legislature has not forbidden the right that the court seeks to es-
tablish. For example, in MacPherson v. Buick Motors, Inc.,175 the court
of appeals provided a new cause of action in negligence for a party
injured by a defectively manufactured automobile, although the plain-
tiff was not in privity of contract with the manufacturer. The court
of appeals there, as it did in Seider, "put aside the notion that the duty
to safeguard life and limb . . . grows out of contract and nothing
else."'176 In Codling v. Paglia 177 the court of appeals extended the
protection of strict products liability to a plaintiff who had neither
purchased the product causing the injury, nor was using it at the time
he was injured. The creation of this cause of action was not authorized
174. It may also be argued that a legislative restraint upon judical development
of causes of action between private parties raises serious separation of powers questions.
Similar considerations may explain the "miracle of Seider," in which the New York
Court of Appeals allowed a defendant to make a limited appearance in spite of a statute
apparently forbidding it. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305,234 N.E.2d 669, 287
N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967). The "miracle" of Seider is described more fully in D. SIEG EL,
supra note 171, at 127-30.
175. 217 N.Y. 382. 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
176. Id. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053.
177. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
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by statute or by pre-existing common law.178 The court was persuaded,
however, that "from the standpoint of justice as regards the operating
aspects of today's products," 179 a new cause of action should be per-
mitted. This creation of a broad, new right,8 0 based upon a recogni-
tion of the practical realities of the modem world, is similar to the
conception of the direct action which Seider seems to have wrought.
Judicial creation of a direct action seems consistent with the legis-
lative purposes of the relevant provisions of the Insurance Law. "Prior
to the enactment of section 109 of the Insurance Law,"''" the predeces-
sor of section 167, "an injured person possessed no cause of action
against the insurer of the tort feasor because of [a] lack of privity of
contract.' -8 2 Thus if the insurer were insolvent and unable to satisfy
the judgment against him, the insurer would be released from obliga-
tion. This was based on the theory that the "policy [was] one of in-
demnity against loss suffered" by the insured. If, due to his insolvency,
he suffered no damage, there was no loss for the insurer -to indemnify.'83
Section 109 was enacted to correct this apparent injustice by pro-
viding the injured plaintiff with a causee of action against the in-
surer, once the insured defendant was found liable.18 4 In Materazzi
v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., 5 -the court found this pro-
vision to be for the benefit of persons injured or suffering damage,
not solely for the benefit of the insured."' It is therefore somewhat
curious that section 167 of the Insurance Law, found to grant a
cause of action to injured plaintiffs, might subsequently be used as a
ground for precluding a cause of action-a direct action against the
insurer-for this same class of litigants.87 While strict construction
of the Insurance Law might prohibit all direct actions except those
authorized by section 167, strict construction seems unwarranted; these
178. See id. at 338, 298 N.E.2d at 626, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
179. Id. at 341, 298 N.E.2d at 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
180. Id. at 339, 298 N.E.2d at 626, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
181. 1909 N.Y. LAws, c. 33.
182. Jackson v. Citizens Gas. Co., 277 N.Y. 385, 389, 14 N.E.2d 446, 447 (1938).
183. Id.
184. See id. at 390, 14 N.E.2d at 448.
185. 157 Misc. 365, 283 N.Y.S. 942 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 246 A.D. 522, 283 N.Y.S.
430 (lst Dep't 1935).
186. 157 Misc. at 368, 283 N.Y.S. at 944.
187. Professor Siegel hints that a direct action can be fitted into Insurance Law
§ 167 by judicial construction. He feels that even if such a construction is precluded by
the language of the statute, the barrier could be overcome. Siegel, Supplementary
Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Civ. PrAc. LAW § 5201, at 51-52 (McKinney 1978).
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provisions could just as readily be found merely to authorize a limited
cause of action, and not to preclude others.1 18
The judicial creation of a right to a direct action against an insurer
would not be unique to New York. In Shingleton v. Bussey, s9 the
Florida Supreme Court affirmed the use of a direct action against an
insurer in a motor vehicle liability suit. Basing the suit of the injured
plaintiff on the insurance contract, the court found that
"[T]he general public, subjected to possible injury through [the in-
sured's] negligent operation of a motor vehicle, possessed more than
a mere 'incidental' benefit from the contract to procure public lia-
bility insurance. It was, in effect, a real party in interest to this con-
tract. . . . [Automobile insurance] is no longer a private contract
merely between two parties." [W]e think there exists sufficient rea-
son to raise by operation of law the intent to benefit injured third
parties and thus to render motor vehicle liability insurance amenable
to the third party beneficiary doctrine- 90
Thus, by characterizing the injured plaintiff as a third party bene-
ficiary of the insurance contract, and by reading into -that contract an
implied term obligating the insurer to defend the insured wherever
the insurer is doing business, the New York Court of Appeals could
create a direct action in Seider situations.
The New York courts' reluctance to characterize Seider as per-
mitting a direct action against the insurer may be attributable in part
to the desire to avoid inflated jury awards by preserving the anonymity
of the defending insurance company. 19 ' However, as the Court of Ap-
peals recognized in Oltarsh v. Aetna Insurance Co. 192 it is a rare
juror who does not know that defendants in automobile negligence
188. Section 109 (now § 167) has been classified as both a remedial statute,
Jackson v. Citizens Casualty Co., 277 N.Y. 385, 389, 14 N.E.2d 446, 447 (1938), and
as a statute in derogation of the common law, Royal Indemnity Co. v. Traveler's
Ins. Co., 244 A.D. 582, 584, 280 N.Y.S. 485, 487 (Ist Dep't 1935). Remedial statutes
are construed so that "the intention of a remedial statute will always prevail over the
literal sense of its terms." H. BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAws,
487 (2d ed. 1911). On the other hand, a statute in derogation of the common law
is strictly construed. H. BLACK, supra at 367. See Dean v. The Metropolitan Elevated Ry.
Co., 119 N.Y. 541, 547 (1890). Although a construction of § 167 as in derogation of
the common law might preclude the use of a direct action by a Seider plaintiff, the
courts have not in recent years found such characterizations of statutes to be controlling.
189. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
190. Id. at 715-16 (quoting Gothberg v. Nemerovski, 58 Ill. App. 2d 372, 208
N.E.2d 12 (1965) ).
191. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 1004 (E.D.N.Y., 1977),
aff'd, No. 78-7050 (2d Cir. June 12, 1978); Rodriguez v. Wolfe, 93 Misc. 2d 364,
367-68, 401 N.Y.S.2d 442, 445 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
192. 15 N.Y.2d 111, 118, 204 N.E.2d 622, 626, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577, 583 (1965)
(quoting Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1963) ).
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cases are insured, and that an insurance company is defending the
action. Further, the desire to keep jury awards down may be mis-
placed. It has been asserted that juries in two major direct action
states render lower verdicts than those in most other states.103
Seider actions differ from direct actions allowed in other states
in two significant ways. In a typical statutory direct action, the named
defendant is the insurance company. 19 4 In the Seider action, however,
while the insurer is the real party in interest, it is not the named
defendant. More significantly, the direct action statutes "limit applica-
tion of the direct action to tortious acts occurring within the borders
of the state."'u 5 Thus the direct action statutes predicate jurisdiction
upon the fact that the insurer has some contacts with the state where
the action is brought, because its policy holder has committed the
tortious act there. Thus there is no need to consider whether the
insurance company is doing business within the state.100 Seider juris-
dication differs from these statutes in that it applies to torts occurring
outside of the forum state.197 Seider instead bases its jurisdiction on
the location of the insurance company in the state. With the possible
exception of the single attached insurance policy, the insurer's activity
within New York is unrelated to the dispute.
In analyzing Seider's viability as a direct action in light of Shaffer's
jurisdictional requirement, the first question is whether these con-
tacts between the insurer and the forum satisfy the Shaffer standard.
When the insurer is considered the real party defendant, the attached
insurance policy remains no less questionably related to the cause of
action than when it is not.198 However, other contacts between the
defendant and the forum emerge that are not present when the in-
sured is deeemed the defendant. Seider, in fact, requires the plaintiff
to show the existence of such additional contacts between the insurer
and the forum before jurisdiction will be asserted: the plaintiff must
demonstrate the insurer's "presence" in the state. 09
193. Note, supra note 160, at 358 n.12.
194. E.g. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1959).
195. Comment, Jurisdiction-Quasi In Rem: Seider v. Roth to Turner v. Evers-
Wrong Means to the Right End, 11 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 504, 513 (1974). See Koss v.
Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 341 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1965) (Wisconsin statute);
Weingartner v. Fidelity Mut. Ins, Co., 205 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1953) (Louisiana
statute).
196. Note, Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies: What Remains of the
Seider Doctrine After Seven Years of Conflict, 34 OHIo STATE L.J. 818, 835 (1973).
197. Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L.
REv. 654, 655 n.7 (1967).
198. See notes 148-154 & accompanying text supra.
199. Beja v. Jahangiri, 453 F.2d 959, 963 (2d Cir. 1972); Simpson v. Loehmann,
21 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 324 N.E.2d 669, 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637 (1967).
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The requirement of presence is the New York "doing business"
test for jurisdiction under CPLR § 30L 200 This test was first articu-
lated in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 201 where jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation was permitted when it was present in the state,
"not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence
and continuity," irrespective of the relationship between those con-
tacts and the cause of action.202 The "doing business" test does not
require the primary activities of the defendant to be carried on in
New York, but the defendant or its agent must solicit business in New
York systematically.203 In Ford v. Unity Hospital,204 this test was
equated with the Hanson standard, requiring the defendant to have
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities with-
in the forum state.205 Thus, Seider's traditional presence test, combined
with the characterization of Seider as a direct action, provides the
purposeful entry, physical presence, and foreseeability to suit man-
dated by the Shaffer standard. 20 6
Once these contacts are established, the jurisdictional inquiry then
proceeds to questioning the sufficiency of the nexus between the state
and the litigation. This goes to the second prong of the International
Shoe test-whether the forum is a fair and reasonable place to litigate
the suit.2 0 7 In Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.208 the
Supreme Court had occasion to assess the fairness of the choice of
forum in litigation arising under the Louisiana direct action statute.
The Court emphasized the interest that Louisiana had in trying the
litigation, including the care which the state might have to provide
to residents killed or injured in the forum. 20 9 The Court concluded
that Louisiana's interests outweighed those of the state where the
policy was issued.2 10
200. Beja v. Jahangiri, 453 F.2d 959, 961 (2d Cir. 1972). Section 301 permits a
court to "exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have been
exercised heretofore." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 301 (McKinney 1972). This section
permits jurisdiction to be exercised as it might have been prior to the effective date of
§ 301. McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 301 at 5 (McKinney
1972).
201. 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
202. Id. at 267, 115 N.E. at 917.
203. McLaughlin, supra note 200 at 6.
204. 32 N.Y.2d 464, 299 N.E.2d 659, 346 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1973).
205. Id. at 471, 299 N.E.2d at 663, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
206. See text following note 137 supra.
207. See text following note 137 supra.
208. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
209. Id. at 72.
210. Id. at 73.
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In Minichiello v. Rosenberg,21 1 a pre-Shaffer case, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals upheld the Seider doctrine and found the state
interests examined in Watson to be of equal importance in a Seider
action.21 2 The majority believed that in Watson it was not the loca-
tion of the accident, but the interests of the injured plaintiff's state
of residence, which compelled the litigation to be tried there.21a Thus
Seider's fairness was based on the interests of New York in caring for
its injured residents. 21 4 The court in Minichiello noted that this was
reflected in the Seider requirement that the plaintiff be a resident of
New York. 21 5 The court's finding was bolstered by the limited appear-
ance protection accorded the defendant. 16
This interpretation of Watson is supported by with the Supreme
Court's decision in Crider v. Zurich Insurance Co.2 17 There the Court
found the interest of the state in which the injured party resided
greater than that of the forum where the injury occurred, because it
was to his residence that the injured plaintiff returned, and it was his
community that was apt to feel most keenly the impact of the injury.
211. 410 F.2d 106, aff'd en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 844 (1969).
212. Id. at 109-10.
213. Id. at 110.
214. Note, supra note 196, at 835. In Barker v. Smith, 290 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), the facts showed that the plaintiff, injured outside of New York, had received
significant medical treatment in New York, and that further treatment might be necessary.
Id. at 713.
Judge Anderson, dissenting in Minichiello, disagreed with the comparison between
interests in Watson and those in a Seider action. 410 F.2d at 114. He distinguished
Watson on the ground that the nonresidents there had, by their own volition, brought
themselves within the bounds of jurisdiction of the state where the accident occurred.
Id. at 115. But this argument concerns the sufficiency of the contacts between the de-
fendant and the forum, not considerations of fairness, which must also weigh the state's
interests and the burden that out-of-state litigation imposes upon the plaintiff.
215. 410 F.2d at 110.
216. Id. at 111. Now that Shaffer has contradicted the assumptions underlying
the limited appearance doctrine, see notes 82-88 & accompanying text supra, it is worth
noting that when the Seider action is viewed as a direct action against the insurer, the
limited appearance device is not necessary to limit the potential liability stemming from
the lawsuit. If the insurer is being sued on the basis of a contractual obligation, con-
tract law will limit the liability of the insurer to the limit specified in the insurer's
policy with the insured.
On rehearing en banc, the court in Minichiello discussed the burden that Seider.
imposes on the defendant in light of Harris v, Balk. The majority felt that this burden
was significantly less serious than that found in Harris. In Seider actions the named
defendant is furnished counsel by the insurer. An unfavorable judgment against the
defendant causes him no loss since the insurance policy debt could not have been
realized in any other way. 410 F.2d at 118. Although Harris has been overruled by
Shaffer, this analysis is still valid because it was the inadequacy of defendant contacts
within the forum that Shaffer scored. The Supreme Court in Shaffer never examined
the state interest or the burden imposed upon the defendant in Harris.
217. 380 U.S. 39 (1965).
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Jurisdiction was thus upheld in the state where the plaintiff resided,
although the cause of action occurred outside that forum. 218
Thus, when Seider is viewed as a direct action, reaching the in-
surer while imposing few burdens on the named defendant, the Shaffer
standard is met. In its application of International Shoe to all assertions
of jurisdiction, Shaffer aimed at eliminating the type of quasi in rem
jurisdiction that involves little contact between the defendant and
the forum or, for other reasons, results in an unfair choice of forum.
Since Seider as a direct action involves a defendant doing business in
the forum state, it surpasses the hurdle of minimum contacts. The
fairness of the choice of forum in the Seider action was determined
years ago in Minichiello. There is no reason to believe that Mini-
chiello's finding that the state interests involved in Seider, making
New York a fair choice of forum, is affected by the Shaffer decision.
This was recognized by -the Eastern District of New York in O'Connor
v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.219 which quoted at length from both Mini-
chiello and Simpson in upholding Seider in a post-Schaffer challenge. 2 0
The language of Minichiello and Simpson was found to adumbrate
Shaffer, and to rest, like Shaffer, on International Shoe.2 1 Therefore,
if the Seider doctrine is recognized to be a direct action aimed to
reach the insurer, it should satisfy the new jurisdictional requirements
of Shaffer.
CONCLUSION
Shaffer's extension of International Shoe to all assertions of state
court jurisdiction is a landmark in American jurisdiction theory. Justice
Marshall's opinion promises to eliminate the special role that property
has played in defining state court power. While only time and future
decisions can flesh out the jurisdictional scheme established by Shaffer,
the opinion harkens to the call of commentators to give up the ghost
of the res..
This ghost, however, may not be given up so easily. Shaffer has
already been interpreted as retaining a determinative role for property
in granting jurisdiction.2 22 Such a role is unjustified. Even a defend-
ant's ownership of real property-which concededly creates substantial
218. Id. at 41.
219. 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, No. 78-7050 (2d Cir., June 12,
1978).
220. Id. at 999-1001.
221. Id. at 999.
222. See Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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contacts with the locale--does not by itself give rise to sufficient con-
tacts among the defendant, the forum, and litigation unrelated to the
res, to justify the forum's adjudication of such a controversy. Nor
should the use of a limited appearance alter this conclusion by lowering
the threshold of contacts necessary to sustain jurisdiction. Such an
incorporation of the limited appearance into the minimum contacts
calculus would only saddle Shaffer with a vestige of res-based jurisdic-
tion inappropriate to a jurisdictional standard based on fairness. Use
of the limited appearance in this way would mean that it no longer
serves as a shield for the defendant, but would serve instead as a
sword for the plaintiff.22 This result would be of questionable con-
stitutionality after Shaffer, and of dubious value as a matter of policy.
Matters of fairness to the defendant, who would still be required
to litigate a claim out-of-state, and of judicial economy argue against
the retention of a doctrine which is, after Shaffer, of at best marginal
value as a jurisdictional device. In sum, therefore, the jurisdictional
role of the limited appearance should be greatly reduced, if not entirely
eliminated.
Shaffer's emphasis upon the contacts between the defendant and
the forum, combined with its weakening of the rationale underlying
the limited appearance, calls into question the constitutionality of
New York's Seider doctrine. Seider permits an injured New York resi-
dent to bring a personal injury action in New York regardless of the
location of the alleged tort, provided that the defendant is insured by
a company doing business in New York. Although the Seider doctrine
exists for the benefit of the plaintiff, its fairness is assured because it
does not seriously inconvenience the defendant. This is so because of
the realities of litigation: In a Seider action, it is the insurer alone
who presents the defense and is economically jeopardized by the liti-
gation. Thus the nominal defendant, the insured, need not conduct a
defense far from home. Nor is the insurer inconvenienced by the
choice of a New York forum, since Seider affects only those insurers
who are already doing business in New York.
However, a Shaffer analysis of the contacts between the named de-
fendant and the New York forum would preclude an assertion of juris-
diction in a Seider action. The relationship between the liability in-
223. If the limited appearance had been constitutionally required for assertions
of quasi in rem jurisdiction, it might have been said that the limited appearance always
served as a sword for the plaintiff. Prior to .Shaffer, however, no Supreme Court ruling
had ever imposed such a requirement, and the Court in Shaffer passed up an opportunity
to decide the case before it on just that point.
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surance policy and the controversy does not aid jurisdiction because
it does not indicate any expectation of the insured defendant to bene-
fit from New York protection of his interest in the property. Only
when Seider is viewed as a direct action against the insurance com-
pany is the Shaffer minimum contacts test met. The requirement in
Seider that the insurer be present in the state, and New York's inter-
est in the welfare of its injured citizens, together provide that contact
between the insurer-defendant and the New York forum that is neces-
sary for jurisdiction. If viewed as an action deriving from an implied
contractual term benefitting the plaintiff, a third party, the direct ac-
tion against the insurer is contractually limited in scope to the face
amount of the insurance contract. This formulation of the direct ac-
tion thus eliminates the need for the limited appearance in Seider
actions.
Despite assertions to the contrary, there is no statutory provision
precluding the creation of a direct action in New York. Section 167
of the New York Insurance Law provides for a limited form of direct
action in favor of injured plaintiffs. By focusing on the limitations
on that statutory cause of action, some courts and commentators have
said that the judiciary cannot expand upon the statutorily-created
existing direct actions.224 This view, however, ignores the absence of
any specific prohibition of judicial expansion of the direct action, the
liberalizing intent behind section 167, and inherent powers of com-
mon law courts to develop new causes of action.
Viewing Seider as authorizing a direct action, therefore, serves
two purposes. First, it assures the constitutionality of the doctrine
after Shaffer. Second, by allowing the courts to base jurisdiction upon
the presence of the insurer in New York, rather than that of the in-
surance contract, the direct action theory forgoes any reliance upon
the presence of a res for its assertion of jurisdiction, harmonizing
Seider with the philosophy underlying Shaffer.
Although Shaffer's primary impact is on the ability of state courts
'to obtain jurisdiction over a controversy, it also affects traditional pro-
cedural due process requirements for foreign attachments. Shaffer casts
doubt upon any future reliance upon Ownbey v. Morgan for the con-
stitutionality of pre-judgment attachment procedures affording few
safeguards for the defendant. Instead, Shaffer indicates that the Mit-
chell v. W.T. Grant procedural safeguards are probably necessary
224. See note 171 supra.
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when a defendant's property is attached.2 5 If this is the case, Shaffer
will result in greater protection for nonresident defendants whose
property is subject to attachment; and more uncertainty and cost to
plaintiffs who attempt to acquire in rem jurisdiction, since the plain-
tiff will need to show the existence of minimum contacts at a prompt
post-seizure hearing.
Shaffer v. Heitner makes the notion of fairness paramount in the
exercise of state court jurisdiction. No longer is power over the res
sufficient to justify the assertion of in rem jurisdiction. All assertions
of that power, including New York's Seider doctrine, will survive only
if they are deemed fair under the due process standards of Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny. Some doctrines based upon old notions
of in rem power, such as the limited appearance and the attachment
of property as a device to obtain jurisdiction, may leave vestigal traces
upon the corpus of jurisdictional practice. By and large, however, the
ghost of the res will probably relinquish its hold on the living law,
and pass at last into the domain of legal history.
MARK F. FLESCHER
DENNIS P. HARKAWIK
225. In this way, Shaffer buttresses, Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123
(3d Cir. 1976), which required these safeguards.
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